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I Request for advice of 27 March 2017 on the draft conclusions adopted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties 
II Draft conclusions of the International Law Commission on subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, as 
adopted on first reading (chapter VI of the ILC report of 2016, doc. no. A/71/10) 








In his letter of 27 March 2017 the Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the Advisory 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law (the Committee) to prepare an advisory 
report on the draft conclusions of the International Law Commission (ILC)0F1 of the United 
Nations on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation 
of treaties, as adopted on first reading. These draft conclusions deal with the meaning of 
article 31, paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969 (the Vienna Convention) and the conditions on which they may be applied.1F2  
The Committee has the honour to submit the following advice to the Minister and hopes 
that its findings will aid the contribution to be made by the Netherlands to the follow-up 
debate on the draft conclusions. 
 
2. General remarks 
 
The Committee takes a generally positive view of the draft conclusions and would 
therefore like to express its appreciation for the ILC's work to date. 
 
2.1 Status of positions taken by the International Law Commission 
The first question that arises in connection with the ILC's project on subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice2F3 in relation to the interpretation of treaties is what 
relevance or weight should be given to its conclusions. This is an issue which the ILC itself 
has not addressed. 
Many different factors play a role in determining what significance may be attached to the 
work of the ILC: 
- As a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the ILC helps to implement the General 
Assembly’s task under article 13, paragraph 1(a) of the Charter of the United Nations of 
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification. 
- The composition of the ILC, the position of its members (who function as independent 
                                                            
1 The ILC was established by the United Nations in 1948 and is formally a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The ILC has its permanent seat in Geneva and currently has 34 members. It 
assists the General Assembly in implementing article 13 of the UN Charter, on the basis of which the General 
Assembly makes recommendations for the development of international law and its codification.  
2 Annexe II to this advisory report contains the ILC's draft conclusions as adopted on first reading. Unless stated 
otherwise, all references to pages and sections in this report relate to UN document A/71/10, in which the text of 
the draft conclusions and the commentary are contained on pages 120-240. 
3 In the original Dutch text of this advisory report the Committee has chosen to use the term ‘praktijk’ (practice) 
rather than ‘gebruik’ (use), which is the term employed in the Dutch translation of the Vienna Convention 
(article 31, paragraph 3(b): “ieder later gebruik in de toepassing van het verdrag waardoor overeenstemming van 
de partijen inzake de uitlegging van het verdrag is ontstaan”). This is because the term ‘praktijk’ seems to be 
closer to the English text of article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna Convention (‘any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’). 
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experts), the position of the special rapporteur and the reaction of the ILC’s members to the 
work of the rapporteur.  
- The stage which the work of the ILC has reached. Needless to say, greater weight must 
be given to the final conclusions of the ILC as a whole than to the individual reports of the 
special rapporteurs.  
- The comments of States on the work of the ILC in its various stages and the manner in 
which the ILC has taken account of these comments. 
- The extent to which the ILC considers there is codification or progressive development of 
international law. After all, the ILC’s task is not confined to codification of existing 
international law; a text may also contain elements de lege ferenda.  
It would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that – given the stage of the study and the 
incorporated reactions of States – significance can be given to the work of the ILC as a 
special form of ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ within the meaning 
of article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It follows that, in 
general, greater weight should be attached to the work of the ILC than to that of the Institut 
de Droit International (IDI), the International Law Association (ILA) or the work of 
individual writers. 
 
2.2 Consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations in accordance with 
article 25 of the Statute of the International Law Commission 
One of the functions of the Secretary General of the United Nations is to act as depositary 
of multilateral treaties.3F4 This function is discharged by the Office of Legal Affairs (Treaty 
Section) of the United Nations Secretariat. It is apparent from the Summary of Practice of 
the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties4F5 that the depositary has 
extensive experience of matters of interpretation, particularly as regards the application of 
the final clauses of treaties. In addition, the Office of Legal Affairs is often consulted by 
UN member States about more general aspects of the interpretation of treaties. The ILC’s 
report makes no reference whatever to the opinions published in the United Nations 
Juridical Yearbook (e.g. 1967 and 2004), although secretariats of multilateral treaties 
regularly seek the opinion of the head of the Office of Legal Affairs (UN Legal Counsel) 
on the interpretation of treaties.5F6 These opinions are, in practice, treated as authoritative. 
The Committee therefore considers that it would be advisable for the ILC, in accordance 
with article 25 of its Statute, to consult the Office of Legal Affairs, in particular the Treaty 
Section of the Secretariat, as a competent organ on this topic.  
  
                                                            
4 Article 98 of the Charter of the United Nations, resolution 24(1) of 12 February 1946 of the General Assembly. 
5 See <https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/practice/summary_english.pdf>. 




2.3 Good faith and manifest misapplication of a treaty 
The ILC states several times in its report that a ‘manifest misapplication of a treaty, as 
opposed to a bona fide application (even if erroneous), is therefore not an “application of 
the treaty” in the sense of articles 31 and 32’ (report pp. 142-143 § 19; see also p. 151 § 8). 
The Committee regards this position as somewhat problematic. Naturally, treaties have to 
be applied and interpreted in accordance with the principle of good faith (articles 26 and 
31(1) Vienna Convention). At the same time, every application of a treaty presupposes a 
given interpretation of the terms of the treaty and their legal implications (the existence and 
scope of obligations and rights). The wording used by the ILC, namely ‘a manifest 
misapplication’, seems to suggest that it is relatively easy to determine whether a given 
application of a treaty is incorrect, but in many cases this requires extensive and thorough 
interpretation of the treaty in accordance with the general rule of article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention. The aim of article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna Convention is to allow 
examination of whether practice in the application of a treaty reflects an interpretation 
supported by all parties to the treaty.6F7 Even if a given practice of a party is disregarded as 
being ‘a manifest misapplication’ of the treaty, it is still highly unlikely that one could 
come to the conclusion that an agreement among all parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty exists. The Committee notes that an absence of good faith should instead be 
assessed on the basis of article 31, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention and recommends 
that greater emphasis should be placed on the aforementioned considerations in the 
commentary. 
  
                                                            
7 The text adopted by the ILC in 1964 spoke of a practice establishing ‘the understanding of all the parties’, 
which was altered in 1966 to ‘the understanding of the parties’. According to the explanation given by the ILC, 
this alteration was intended not to change the rule, but merely to clarify that not every party needed to contribute 
individually to the relevant practice. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Volume II, 
221-222 § 15 (commentary on article 27, renumbered as article 31). 
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3. Remarks on selected draft conclusions
3.1 Draft conclusion 2 on the general rule and means of treaty interpretation 
Conclusion 2 
General rule and means of treaty interpretation 
1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth,
respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary means of
interpretation. These rules also apply as customary international law.
2. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
3. Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, inter alia, that there shall be taken into
account, together with the context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; and (b) any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation.
4. Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.
5. The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which
places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated,
respectively, in articles 31 and 32.
In paragraph 5 of draft conclusion 2 the ILC states that ‘[t]he interpretation of a treaty 
consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate emphasis on the various 
means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 32’. It adds in the 
commentary (pp. 125-126 § 3) that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention must be 
read together as they constitute ‘an integrated framework’ for the interpretation of treaties. 
The Committee would point out that treaty interpretation as ‘a single combined operation’ 
is, in principle, limited to article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as also noted by the ILC 
itself in the commentary (YBILC, Volume II, pp. 219-220 § 8, 1966). This position is also 
prompted by the decision to treat article 32 of the Vienna Convention, in principle, as 
optional and hence as a supplementary means of interpretation, since the sole purpose of 
the elements it contains is to confirm an established interpretation or decide on an 
interpretation where the meaning would otherwise be ambiguous or the result absurd or 
unreasonable.  
The ILC also states in paragraph 5 of draft conclusion 3 that ‘appropriate emphasis’ should 
be placed ‘on the various means of interpretation’ and refers fairly regularly in its 
commentary (p. 128 § 7; pp. 130-131 § 12-15; pp. 133-134 § 4; pp. 165-166 § 2; p. 193 
footnote 788) to the absence of ‘primacy’ or ‘hierarchy’ among the elements of 
interpretation referred to in article 31, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention. The 
Committee can accept the idea that there is no specific primacy or hierarchy among the 
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various elements of interpretation. However, it wishes to point out that, in view of the 
wording used in article 31, a certain weight can be given to the various elements. For 
example, paragraph 1 of article 31 states that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context, whereas this is to be 
done in the light of its object and purpose. Paragraph 3 of article 31 also states that the 
elements of interpretation it lists should also be taken into account together with the 
context, without themselves clearly forming part of the context. It follows that article 31 
provides a certain ranking of these elements as part of the entire process of interpretation, 
and that as a result those elements referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 outweigh, in principle, 
those mentioned in paragraph 3.  
The Committee considers that greater emphasis could be placed on these aspects in the 
commentary. 
 




Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice 
1. A 'subsequent agreement' as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, 
paragraph 3 (a), is an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a 
treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. 
2. A 'subsequent practice' as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31, 
paragraph 3 (b), consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. 
3. Other 'subsequent practice' as a supplementary means of interpretation under 
article 32 consists of conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, 
after its conclusion. 
 
In draft conclusion 4 the ILC speaks of subsequent practice in the application of a treaty 
‘after its conclusion’. The ILC explains this (pp. 137-138 § 2-3) and states that the moment 
of conclusion of a treaty (or determination of its definite text) precedes its entry into force. 
The ILC motivates this position by saying that it would be hard to think of a reason why a 
practice that takes place between conclusion and entry into force should not be relevant for 
the purpose of interpretation.  
The Committee considers that by taking this position the ILC may possibly be interpreting 
the text of article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna Convention too broadly. The text refers 
to ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty’, which seems to imply that the 
treaty has entered into force. This interpretation is certainly supported by the remainder of 
article 31, paragraph 3(b), which refers to ‘the agreement of the parties’. A party is defined 
in article 2, paragraph 1(g) of the Vienna Convention as ‘a State which has consented to be 
bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force’. 
Although recognising that State practice before the entry into force of a treaty should be 
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taken into account, the Committee thinks it would be desirable to specify exactly what 
situations are envisaged and what the value of the practice is in those cases. A distinction 
can be made in this connection, for example, between the practice of States which are not 
yet parties but have already signed the treaty (see also the obligation in article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention) and earlier practice of States before signing the treaty. The Committee 
believes that if practice is to be relevant it must in any event be that of States which have 
signed the treaty in question or have acceded to it before its entry into force. It also seems 
advisable to note that practice is certainly relevant for the purposes of article 31, 
paragraph 3(b) if the treaty in question provides for provisional application. However, the 
Committee wonders whether the parties to a treaty would be bound to take account of State 
practice when interpreting the treaty concerned if they had signed but not yet ratified it. 
This could be reflected in the commentary on this draft conclusion.  
 
3.3 Draft conclusion 5 on attribution of subsequent practice 
 
Conclusion 5 
Attribution of subsequent practice 
1. Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the 
application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international 
law. 
2. Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent 
practice under articles 31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when 
assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty. 
 
In paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 5 the ILC states that practice in the application of a 
treaty is relevant only if it is attributable to a party to the treaty. More specifically, the ILC 
indicates in paragraph 2 that other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not 
constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, but may 
be relevant when assessing the practice of parties to a treaty. 
 
This may be too limited, particularly, for example, as regards the practice of treaty bodies. 
Although they are dealt with extensively elsewhere, it would be appropriate to include at 
least one or more cross-references in this draft conclusion.7F8 
 
  
                                                            
8 The Committee would note in this respect that what is relevant here is not what treaty bodies contribute to a 
treaty’s interpretation as such but the fact that, since they apply the treaty, their application is relevant as practice 
‘in the application of the treaty’. For example, if the Human Rights Committee (HRC) formulates a general 
comment, this is an act which applies the ICCPR and is thus relevant to the practice concerning the provision 
allowing for general comments by the HRC. Ultimately this practice is relevant to the question of whether the 




3.4 Draft conclusion 7 on possible effects of subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in interpretation 
 
Conclusion 7 
Possible effects of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in interpretation 
1. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, 
contribute, in their interaction with other means of interpretation, to the clarification 
of the meaning of a treaty. This may result in narrowing, widening, or otherwise 
determining the range of possible interpretations, including any scope for the exercise 
of discretion which the treaty accords to the parties. 
2. Subsequent practice under article 32 can also contribute to the clarification of 
the meaning of a treaty. 
3. It is presumed that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement subsequently arrived 
at or a practice in the application of the treaty, intend to interpret the treaty, not to 
amend or to modify it. The possibility of amending or modifying a treaty by 
subsequent practice of the parties has not been generally recognized. The present draft 
conclusion is without prejudice to the rules on the amendment or modification of 
treaties under the 1969 Vienna Convention and under customary international law. 
 
In draft conclusion 7 the ILC expresses its views on the possible effects of subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in the interpretation of a treaty. It states in this 
connection that ‘[t]his may result in narrowing, widening, or otherwise determining the 
range of possible interpretations, including any scope for the exercise of discretion which 
the treaty accords to the parties’. The commentary (p. 165-166 § 2) adopts a rather more 
restricted approach, as it speaks about clarifying the meaning of a treaty in the sense of 
narrowing down possible meanings of a particular provision or the scope of the treaty as a 
whole, confirming a wider interpretation or understanding the range of possible 
interpretations. 
The Committee is concerned about the chosen wording of draft conclusion 7, paragraph 1. 
By referring to the possibility of widening or narrowing the range of possible 
interpretations, the ILC seems to be indicating not only that the interpretations can be 
wider or narrower but also that the parties, by means of subsequent agreements or 
subsequent practice, can support interpretations that are not based on possible 
interpretations of the wording of the treaty. This suggests that not only interpretations infra 
legem (and possibly also praeter legem) but also interpretations contra legem are 
permissible. In the latter case, this would constitute a change or amendment to the treaty 
rather than an interpretation. 
The Committee feels it would be desirable for this to be taken into account in the final 
wording of this draft conclusion.  
In the commentary on paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 7 (pp. 173-180 § 21-37), the ILC 
deals at length with the modification of a treaty by means of practice and concludes (p. 180 
§ 38) that ‘while there exists some support in international case law that, absent indications 
in the treaty to the contrary, the agreed subsequent practice of the parties theoretically may 
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lead to modifications of a treaty, the actual occurrence of that effect is not to be presumed. 
Instead, States and courts prefer to make every effort to conceive of an agreed subsequent 
practice of the parties as an effort to interpret the treaty in a particular way.’ The 
Committee can agree with this position. 
The reasoning (p. 180 § 38) concerns only the ‘agreed subsequent practice of the parties’ 
(italics added by the Committee) in the sense of article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna 
Convention and does not cover subsequent agreements as referred to in article 31, 
paragraph 3(a) of the Vienna Convention. However, the wording of draft conclusion 7, 
paragraph 3 is also based on a presumption ‘that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement 
subsequently arrived at or a practice in the application of the treaty, intend to interpret the 
treaty, not to amend or to modify it’. The following sentence, which states that the 
possibility of amending or modifying a treaty ‘by subsequent practice of the parties has not 
been generally recognized’, therefore does not relate to the modification or amendment of 
a treaty by ‘an agreement subsequently arrived at’ (italics added by the Committee). On 
the contrary, article 39 et seq. of the Vienna Convention explicitly confirm the right of the 
parties to amend a treaty. 
It therefore seems to the Committee to be doubtful whether there should be a presumption 
that where the parties to a treaty reach subsequent agreement among themselves they do 
not intend to amend or modify the treaty, particularly where such subsequent agreement is 
recorded in legally binding form.  
 
3.5 Draft conclusion 10 [9] on agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a 
treaty 
 
Conclusion 10 [9] 
Agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty 
1. An agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), requires a common 
understanding regarding the interpretation of a treaty which the parties are aware of and 
accept. Though it shall be taken into account, such an agreement need not be legally 
binding. 
2. The number of parties that must actively engage in subsequent practice in order 
to establish an agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), may vary. Silence on the 
part of one or more parties can constitute acceptance of the subsequent practice when 
the circumstances call for some reaction. 
 
The second sentence of paragraph 1 of draft conclusion 10 [9] provides that an agreement 
between the parties about the interpretation of a treaty ‘need not be legally binding’. That 
may be the case, but the question is whether the binding or non-binding character of the 
agreement between the parties does not affect the interpretation of the treaty. Whereas a 
non-legally binding agreement between parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty 
should be regarded as one of the various factors which play a role in the interpretation 
process, the Committee considers that where there is a legally binding agreement between 
the parties about the interpretation of a treaty, the matter should, in principle, be treated as 
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settled. In the Committee's view, the commentary on this draft conclusion should deal with 
this issue explicitly. 
 
3.6 Draft conclusion 11 [10] on decisions adopted within the framework of a conference 
of parties  
 
Conclusion 11 [10] 
Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties 
1. A Conference of States Parties, under these draft conclusions, is a meeting of 
States parties pursuant to a treaty for the purpose of reviewing or implementing the 
treaty, except if they act as members of an organ of an international organization. 
2. The legal effect of a decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of 
States Parties depends primarily on the treaty and any applicable rules of procedure. 
Depending on the circumstances, such a decision may embody, explicitly or implicitly, 
a subsequent agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a), or give rise to subsequent 
practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), or to subsequent practice under article 32. 
Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties often 
provide a non-exclusive range of practical options for implementing the treaty. 
3. A decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties 
embodies a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, 
in so far as it expresses agreement in substance between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of a treaty, regardless of the form and the procedure by which the 
decision was adopted, including by consensus. 
 
Paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 11 [10] raises questions concerning the requirement of 
‘agreement in substance’ and the phrase ‘including by consensus’.  
The ILC assumes in its report that in all circumstances covered by paragraph 3(a) of 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention there must be an ‘agreement in substance between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty’ (italics added by the Committee). However, 
paragraph 3(a) of article 31 of the Vienna Convention does not contain the words ‘in 
substance’. Paragraph 3 of draft conclusion 11 [10] provides that it may concern a decision 
of a conference of parties ‘regardless of the form and the procedure by which the decision 
was adopted’. This leaves open the possibility that the decision-making rules of the 
conference of parties allow for a decision to be adopted by a given majority of votes. 
Whether or not such a decision is legally binding on the parties is once again determined 
by the decision-making rules of the conference of parties. As the ILC itself indicates in its 
report, however, the agreement between the parties need not necessarily be of a legally 
binding nature. A decision adopted in this way could also concern the interpretation of a 
treaty. Although there are sound arguments under international institutional law for not 
attaching importance to the voting ratio when determining whether there is an international 
decision, the ILC’s commentary suggests that article 31, paragraph 3(a) of the Vienna 
Convention excludes this possibility as it too requires the agreement of all parties to the 
treaty concerning an interpretation. The commentary on the draft conclusion could deal 
with this divergence, taking into account the various scenarios that can have a bearing on 
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the possible validity of an interpretation in the light of article 31, paragraph 3(a) of the 
Vienna Convention, namely whether or not there is consensus among the parties and 
whether or not there is an ‘agreement in substance’.  
 
3.7 Draft conclusion 12 [11] on constituent instruments of international organisations 
 
Conclusion 12 [11] 
Constituent instruments of international organizations 
1. Articles 31 and 32 apply to a treaty which is the constituent instrument of an 
international organization. Accordingly, subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice under article 31, paragraph 3, are, and other subsequent practice under 
article 32 may be, means of interpretation for such treaties. 
2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, or 
other subsequent practice under article 32, may arise from, or be expressed in, the 
practice of an international organization in the application of its constituent instrument. 
3. Practice of an international organization in the application of its constituent 
instrument may contribute to the interpretation of that instrument when applying 
articles 31, paragraph 1, and 32. 
4. Paragraphs 1 to 3 apply to the interpretation of any treaty which is the constituent 
instrument of an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of 
the organization. 
 
In its commentary (p. 226 § 36 and footnote 965) the ILC states that practice of an 
international organisation can only be relevant for the interpretation of its constituent 
instrument if that organisation is competent, since it is a general requirement that 
international organisations do not act ultra vires. As noted above in relation to good faith 
and (manifest) misapplication of a treaty, whether an act is assessed as intra vires or ultra 
vires depends on how the constituent instrument is interpreted. Another relevant factor 
here, as quoted in the footnote mentioned above, is the ruling of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) that there is a presumption that action to fulfil one of the stated purposes of 
the organisation is not ultra vires. The Committee considers it would be desirable for the 
commentary to give greater prominence to this point. 
After noting that few constituent instruments contain explicit procedural or substantive 
rules regarding their interpretation, the ILC notes in its commentary (pp. 227-228 § 40) in 
connection with the issue of special rules of interpretation, that ‘[s]pecific “relevant rules” 
of interpretation need not be formulated explicitly in the constituent instrument; they may 
also be implied therein, or derive from the “established practice of the organization”.’  
The Committee considers this to be a very far-reaching assertion by the ILC, and wonders 
whether some qualification might not be appropriate. In the absence of explicit rules in a 
treaty, it should be assumed that the general rules of treaty interpretation apply. This is also 
apparent from article 5 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that constituent 
instruments come under the operation of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, in the absence 
of explicit rules in a constituent instrument, it should be assumed that the general rules of 
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treaty interpretation apply. Moreover, the case law of the ICJ, in particular in its opinion 
requested by the WHO, gives no grounds whatever for assuming that specific rules of this 
kind exist. If implicit powers or ‘established practice’ are to serve as the basis for this 
assertion, more thorough argumentation is not merely desirable but essential. 
 
3.8 Draft conclusion 13 [12] on pronouncements of expert treaty bodies 
 
Conclusion 13 [12] 
Pronouncements of expert treaty bodies 
1. For the purpose of these draft conclusions, an expert treaty body is a body 
consisting of experts serving in their personal capacity, which is established under a 
treaty and is not an organ of an international organization. 
2. The relevance of a pronouncement of an expert treaty body for the interpretation 
of a treaty is subject to the applicable rules of the treaty. 
3. A pronouncement of an expert treaty body may give rise to, or refer to, a 
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice by parties under article 31, paragraph 3, 
or other subsequent practice under article 32. Silence by a party shall not be presumed 
to constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), accepting an 
interpretation of a treaty as expressed in a pronouncement of an expert treaty body. 
4. This draft conclusion is without prejudice to the contribution that a 
pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make to the interpretation of a 
treaty. 
 
The Committee broadly agrees with what is said in draft conclusion 13 [12] about the 
significance of pronouncements of expert treaty bodies for the interpretation of treaties. 
The second sentence of paragraph 3 of the draft conclusion states, among other things, that: 
‘Silence by a party shall not be presumed to constitute subsequent practice under article 31, 
paragraph 3 (b), accepting an interpretation of a treaty as expressed in a pronouncement of 
an expert treaty body.’ § 18 of the commentary on the draft conclusion states that: 
‘Paragraph 3, second sentence, does not purport to recognize an exception to this general 
rule [i.e. § 2 of draft conclusion 10 [9], addition by the Committee], but rather intends to 
specify and apply this rule to the typical cases of pronouncements of expert bodies.’ The 
general rule set out in paragraph 2 of draft conclusion 10 [9] is that: ‘Silence on the part of 
one or more parties can constitute acceptance of the subsequent practice when the 
circumstances call for some reaction.’ 
The ILC therefore appears to adopt the same approach in relation to the silence on the part 
of one or more parties, irrespective of whether this silence relates to the determination of a 
position or practice of one or more parties to a treaty or to pronouncements of expert treaty 
bodies. The Committee wonders whether this lack of a distinction on this point is correct. 
Paragraph 4 of draft conclusion 13 [12] reads: ‘This draft conclusion is without prejudice 
to the contribution that a pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make to 
the interpretation of a treaty.’ According to the commentary, this paragraph is the neutral 
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product of two irreconcilable strands of opinion among ILC members. § 27 of the 
commentary on the draft conclusion states that: ‘Ultimately, the Commission decided to 
limit itself, for the time being, to formulating, in paragraph 4 of draft conclusion 13 [12], a 
without prejudice clause. The matter may be taken up again on second reading, in light of 
the views expressed by States’ (italics added by the Committee). The Committee can accept 









Request for advice of 27 March 2017 on the draft conclusions adopted by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to 
the interpretation of treaties 
Draft conclusions of the International Law Commission on subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, as adopted on first reading 
(chapter VI of the ILC report of 2016, doc. no. A/71/10) 







Request for advice of 27 March 2017 on the draft conclusions adopted by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 












Professor R.A. Wessel 
Chair 











Date: 27 March 2017 
Re: Request for advice on the ILC's conclusions 
 
 
Dear Professor Wessel, 
 
I would kindly request the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law to produce 
two separate reports on the draft conclusions on the identification of customary international law, 
adopted by the International Law Commission during its sixty-eighth session (chapter V of the ILC 
report of 2016, doc. no. A/71/10) and its draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, adopted during the same session 
(chapter VI of the ILC report of 2016, doc. no. A/71/10). Please find the draft conclusions enclosed 
with this letter. 
 
I expect that these two reports by your Committee will add considerable value to the Dutch 
commentary on the draft conclusions. 
 
It would be desirable for your report on the identification of customary international law to include 
the role of the Dutch courts. 
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